For centuries, in most societies, the individual was not the fundamental unit of the social order. People belonged first to a family, lineage, community, caste, clan or religious order. Their rights, obligations, property, marriage and sometimes even occupation were largely determined by that belonging. The family was not merely a private sphere: it was an economic, social, demographic and political institution.
The gradual affirmation of individual rights profoundly altered this balance. Equality before the law, personal freedom, consent to marriage, property rights, and access to education and employment progressively placed the individual at the centre of legal systems that had long organised society around groups and inherited statuses.
But this evolution has neither followed the same timeline nor produced the same institutions everywhere. Nor is it complete. According to the World Bank, women worldwide still enjoy only around 67% of the economic rights available to men, and only 4% live in economies considered close to full legal equality under the methodology of Women, Business and the Law 2026.
The issue therefore extends far beyond an opposition between tradition and modernity. It concerns a much deeper transformation: how can the universalisation of individual rights be reconciled with societies that do not all define family, partnership, parenthood, solidarity or intergenerational relations in the same way?
From the Abstract Human Being to the Individual in Society
The modern history of fundamental rights begins with an extraordinarily powerful abstraction: that of a human being entitled to rights independently of birth, rank or social affiliation.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948, represents one of the principal achievements of this development. Drafted by representatives from different legal and cultural traditions, it established, for the first time on such a scale, a set of fundamental rights intended to receive universal protection.
Yet this universality contains a difficulty that gradually became apparent: proclaiming the equality of human beings does not necessarily produce equality within the institutions in which they live. The family is precisely one of those institutions.
A woman could be recognised as a citizen while remaining legally subordinate within marriage. She could possess political rights without enjoying the same property rights as her husband. Employment could be legally accessible while remaining materially constrained by the distribution of domestic responsibilities. Equality proclaimed in the public sphere could therefore stop at the threshold of the home.
A second transformation consequently began: after recognising the individual as a subject of rights, societies increasingly had to examine the relations of power between individuals. It is within this evolution that women’s rights acquire their full significance.
When Rights Enter the Family
The history of women’s rights cannot be reduced to suffrage or access to employment. A decisive part of that history unfolded within the family itself.
Choosing a spouse. Consenting to marriage. Owning and administering property. Inheriting. Exercising a profession. Determining one’s place of residence. Obtaining a divorce. Retaining rights concerning one’s children. Receiving protection against violence committed by a spouse. All these questions concern both individual freedom and the organisation of family life.
The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted in 1979, illustrates this shift. Article 16 calls on states to ensure equality between women and men in marriage and family relations, including the choice of spouse, consent to marriage, responsibilities during marriage and upon its dissolution, and rights concerning children.
International law therefore did not stop at affirming that women should enjoy the same civic rights as men. It progressively entered a domain that had long been regarded as belonging primarily to family autonomy, custom or religion.
This development helps explain some contemporary controversies. The further the principle of equality extends, the more it encounters institutions that were not necessarily built upon formal equality among their members, but upon differentiated roles, responsibilities and statuses.
There Is No Single Global Family
Speaking of “the family” in the singular can therefore be misleading. Family structures differ considerably between societies, but also within the same society. The nuclear household composed of a couple and their children is only one configuration among many. Extended families, single-parent households, multigenerational households, childless couples, people living alone and numerous other arrangements coexist.
Data compiled by UN Women illustrate this diversity: more than 60% of households worldwide fall into configurations other than the couple-with-children model, with extended families accounting for a substantial share of household structures. But the differences concern more than household composition. They also involve the very function of the family.
In some societies, welfare states directly assume a significant share of responsibility for pensions, healthcare, education, dependency and childcare. In others, these functions depend much more heavily on family solidarity. Elsewhere, several systems overlap: the state, extended family, local communities, religious institutions and the informal economy.
The same legal reform can therefore have very different consequences depending on the social environment in which it occurs. Individualising rights in a society with developed pension, healthcare and childcare systems does not mean exactly the same thing as doing so in a society where the family remains the principal mechanism of protection against poverty, old age, illness or unemployment.
Different Paths Towards Equality
European and North American societies have experienced, at different speeds, a particularly extensive individualisation of family law. The legal autonomy of spouses, the expansion of divorce, the transformation of parental authority, recognition of different forms of partnership and the development of public welfare systems have progressively reduced some of the functions once performed exclusively by families. But this Western trajectory is not necessarily the only framework through which the rest of the world can be understood.
In many Muslim-majority societies, for example, reforms of personal-status law take place at the intersection of state law, religious references, economic transformations and social change. National situations themselves differ substantially: speaking of a single “Muslim model” would be as inaccurate as treating the Western world as perfectly homogeneous.
In sub-Saharan Africa, the issue can take another form because state law, customary practices and religious norms may coexist, depending on the country and the area of law concerned. The Maputo Protocol, adopted in 2003 and entering into force in 2005, strengthened the protection of women’s rights at the African level, including in matters relating to marriage, property and access to land.
In East Asia, industrialisation and urbanisation have profoundly transformed family structures without necessarily eliminating norms inherited from societies historically organised around strong intergenerational obligations. Rising female participation in employment, demographic ageing, smaller households and declining fertility are now forcing several governments to reconsider the distribution of responsibilities between families, markets and public institutions.
Latin America presents yet other configurations, where substantial legal advances over recent decades coexist with significant economic inequalities and a domestic workload that remains disproportionately borne by women. According to the International Labour Organization, women in the region spend, depending on the country, between 6.3 and 29.5 more hours per week than men on unpaid care work.
There is therefore no single path leading from the “traditional family” to the “modern family”. There are multiple trajectories in which law, economics, demography, religion, culture and public policy interact.
Work Reveals What Law Alone Cannot Transform
One of the most important developments of the twentieth century was the large-scale entry of women into higher education and paid employment. It substantially increased their economic autonomy. But it also exposed a contradiction. Women’s economic participation can move closer to that of men without family responsibilities changing at the same pace.
Globally, women still perform approximately 76% of all unpaid care work. The International Labour Organization has estimated that the 16.4 billion hours devoted to such activities every day are equivalent to two billion people working eight hours a day without pay.
This reality demonstrates why women’s rights and family organisation cannot be analysed separately. Equality in employment also depends on childcare arrangements, parental leave, working hours, eldercare and the distribution of domestic work. The World Bank now explicitly incorporates safety and childcare into its assessment of the legal and institutional conditions affecting women’s economic participation. The boundary between family policy, economic policy and gender equality is therefore becoming increasingly difficult to draw.
The Family as a Space of Protection and Power
A balanced analysis of the family must nevertheless hold together two realities that are sometimes presented as incompatible. The family is one of the principal spaces of human solidarity. It provides for the upbringing of children, transmission between generations, economic assistance, emotional support and a substantial share of care for dependent people. In many parts of the world, it also remains the primary social safety net. But an institution that protects can also generate relations of dependency.
The economic dependence of one spouse, unequal inheritance rights, forced marriage, the practical impossibility of leaving a violent relationship or the absence of control over one’s own resources demonstrate why the household cannot be regarded as a legally neutral space.
The recognition of domestic violence as a fundamental-rights issue is probably one of the clearest manifestations of this evolution. The Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention requires its parties to adopt measures concerning prevention, victim protection and the prosecution of perpetrators of violence against women and domestic violence. It therefore explicitly establishes that the protection of rights does not stop at the boundary between the public and private spheres.
The issue is consequently not one of choosing between protecting the family and protecting its members. A family capable of providing lasting protection requires the people within it to enjoy protections of their own.
Then the Child Became a Subject of Rights
The transformation did not stop with relations between women and men. For a long time, children were understood primarily through the authority exercised over them. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child helped change this conception by recognising children as holders of rights in their own capacity.
It establishes, among other principles, that the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration in decisions affecting them. At the same time, it recognises the common responsibilities of parents for the upbringing and development of their children and requires states to assist parents in carrying out those responsibilities. This evolution is fundamental because it introduces a third subject of rights into the heart of family relations.
Contemporary law must therefore do more than arbitrate between individual autonomy and family authority, or between the rights of women and men. It must also protect children, preserve their family relationships wherever possible and determine their best interests when the rights or interests of adults conflict. The family thus becomes a space in which several legitimate rights must coexist.
The Contemporary Paradox: Greater Autonomy, Greater Collective Dependence
The individualisation of rights might suggest that modern societies are gradually becoming independent of the family. Reality is more complex.
Populations are ageing. Care requirements are increasing. Children continue to require time, resources and human presence. Older people live longer. Public welfare systems face growing fiscal pressures. The more legally autonomous individuals become, the more important the question of who takes care of whom becomes.
For centuries, much of this work was absorbed by families and, within them, primarily by women. Women’s economic autonomy is gradually making this arrangement more difficult to sustain without a redistribution of responsibilities. The debate over rights therefore leads directly to a major economic question.
If women increasingly work outside the home, who cares for children? If generations live longer but less frequently under the same roof, who cares for older people? If the state assumes more of these responsibilities, how are they financed? If the market provides them, who can afford them? And if families continue to provide them without compensation, how should that burden be distributed?
What once appeared to be a purely private arrangement consequently becomes a matter of public policy.
Universal Rights, Plural Societies
This is probably where the central intellectual difficulty lies. Fundamental rights are built upon a universal ambition. Their logic implies that a person cannot be deprived of freedom or dignity simply because they belong to a society that has historically organised relations between women and men differently. But recognising the universality of a right does not mean that all societies must become identical.
Systems of kinship may differ. Family structures may remain more or less extensive. Intergenerational solidarity may be stronger in some cultures. The place of marriage, religion or community can vary considerably. States may also distribute responsibilities between public institutions, families and markets in different ways.
Cultural diversity is therefore a reality that any global analysis must take seriously. It cannot, however, provide an automatic answer to every question concerning rights. Forced marriage, violence, arbitrary deprivation of liberty or the absence of consent do not become neutral because they are justified by tradition. Conversely, every difference from contemporary Western institutions does not necessarily constitute a violation of fundamental rights. The distinction is essential.
Legal universalism does not necessarily require social uniformity.
Recomposition Rather Than Disappearance
One of the most common errors is ultimately to tell this story as a confrontation between the individual and the family. The evolution observed over the past two centuries is better understood as a transformation of their relationship.
Individuals have progressively become holders of rights that they retain within the family itself. Women are no longer legally conceived solely as wives, mothers or daughters, but as persons possessing rights of their own. Children themselves have become subjects of rights. At the same time, the family remains a fundamental institution for demographic reproduction, education, solidarity, transmission and care. It does not therefore necessarily disappear as individualisation advances. Its nature changes.
Authority tends to become more negotiated. Obligations become more reciprocal. Consent occupies a growing place. Public authorities intervene more extensively in areas once left primarily to family organisation. And economic responsibilities that were previously invisible because they were performed without pay within the household are increasingly measured and treated as political questions. Yet this transformation remains highly uneven.
World Bank data show that in 2026 none of the 190 economies examined provides women with complete equality of economic opportunity across all the dimensions assessed, while fewer than half of the policies and institutions required for the effective implementation of measured rights are in place globally. Law therefore moves faster than some practices, while social transformations can sometimes precede the law.
A New Balance Yet to Be Defined
The history of human rights, women’s rights and the family does not ultimately lead to a definitive social model. It opens a search for balance. Between autonomy and solidarity. Between equality and differentiation. Between individual freedom and responsibilities towards others. Between protecting the family and protecting each of its members. Between the universality of rights and the plurality of cultures.
Contemporary societies answer these questions differently because they emerge from different histories, demographic structures, religions, economic systems and institutions.
Yet they are increasingly confronted with the same pressures: ageing populations, transformations in work, mobility, urbanisation, changing fertility patterns, women’s economic autonomy, the cost of dependency and the redefinition of parental responsibilities.
This is why the family is returning to the centre of debates that were sometimes assumed to concern individual rights alone.
Two centuries of expanding rights have not abolished the family. They have progressively shifted the boundary between what individuals owe to the family, what the family may demand from individuals and what society must guarantee to each person.
The recomposition of the social order is now taking place within this balance. And contrary to what a linear reading of history might suggest, the world does not appear to be converging towards a single form of family. Instead, society by society, it is searching for different ways to reconcile a shared aspiration to individual dignity with a universal human need for transmission, solidarity and belonging.
Main Sources
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights — Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
UNICEF — Convention on the Rights of the Child.
World Bank — Women, Business and the Law 2026; Women, Business and the Law 2024.
UN Women — Progress of the World’s Women: Families in a Changing World; research on family structures and women’s access to justice.
International Labour Organization — research on the care economy, domestic work and unpaid care work.
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights — Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol) and associated materials.
Council of Europe — Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention).
Atlas Limits Research Desk
Atlas Limits’ editorial and analytical desk.


