From diplomatic normalization with Israel to Morocco’s emerging arms industry, the trajectory of businessman Yariv El Baz reveals a less visible dimension of economic power: the intermediaries, holding companies, and private capital that accompany the strategic decisions of states. Revelations about his indirect involvement in the defense industry come as his agribusiness group, Forafric, faces serious financial difficulties. Two trajectories that raise the same question: who owns, finances, and controls the new industrial capabilities presented as instruments of national sovereignty?

At the Marrakech Airshow in October 2026, armored vehicle turrets, remotely operated weapon systems, and new ammunition presented by Moroccan Military Industry tell the story of an important transformation in Morocco’s economy. The Kingdom is no longer seeking merely to purchase military equipment from abroad. It intends to manufacture part of that equipment on its own territory, develop industrial expertise, and establish a position within international defense production chains.

Behind this ambition, however, lies a reality less visible than the industrial facilities themselves. On October 8, an investigation published by Le Desk revealed that two Moroccan companies associated with the Israeli group Elbit Systems count among their shareholders a holding company linked to Yariv El Baz, a businessman known for his role as an intermediary in the diplomatic rapprochement between Morocco, Israel, and the United States in 2020.

The connection between these two episodes deserves attention. Six years separate diplomatic normalization from the military industrialization now underway. In the meantime, political relationships have become institutionalized, defense agreements have been concluded, companies have been established, and capital has been mobilized.

Yariv El Baz’s trajectory thus provides an entry point into a broader phenomenon: the way international relations create economic opportunities for private actors whose interests may extend across several countries, industries, and legal systems.

The Man Between Capitals

In December 2020, when Washington announced the restoration of diplomatic relations between Rabat and Tel Aviv, attention focused on heads of state and senior government officials. Donald Trump, Mohammed VI, Benjamin Netanyahu, and Jared Kushner occupied the diplomatic stage. The shift was significant: the United States recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, while Morocco and Israel agreed to resume and develop official relations.

But the negotiations were not confined to institutional channels.

Information published at the time by The New York Times, subsequently reported and investigated further by several media outlets, identified Yariv El Baz as one of the intermediaries who helped facilitate exchanges between the parties. The businessman reportedly contributed to establishing contacts between the circle of Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita and that of Benjamin Netanyahu, while maintaining relationships with Jared Kushner.

These reports support the identification of a facilitating role, without establishing that El Baz determined the sovereign decisions of the three governments.

The distinction is fundamental. International agreements are concluded by governments, but their preparation may involve networks of trust operating outside formal administrations. Entrepreneurs, investors, advisers, and individuals with connections across several economic or cultural environments sometimes become intermediaries between officials who are not yet willing, or able, to communicate openly.

Their usefulness lies in their ability to move between different worlds. They know decision-makers, understand several regulatory environments, and can identify economic interests capable of supporting a diplomatic initiative.

This proximity also creates a structural difficulty. When a private intermediary participates in opening a political relationship and subsequently appears in economic activities made possible by that relationship, it becomes necessary to distinguish ordinary business continuity from any potential preferential advantage.

In El Baz’s case, none of the publicly available information examined establishes that his industrial interests were granted in exchange for his diplomatic involvement. Their chronological relationship nevertheless constitutes a legitimate subject for investigation.

Three Billion Dollars Between Diplomacy and Finance

The 2020 rapprochement also had a financial dimension.

At the time, The New York Times reported that the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the American development finance institution, was considering investments of up to $3 billion in Moroccan projects.

The sectors discussed included financial institutions, hospitality, and renewable energy. According to contemporary reporting, Yariv El Baz participated in discussions involving the prospect of American financing.

An American official, however, disputed the existence of any conditional relationship between those potential investments and diplomatic normalization.

A distinction must also be made between an investment envelope under consideration and financing actually committed or disbursed. The $3 billion discussed in 2020 cannot be presented as money received by Morocco or controlled by El Baz.

The episode nevertheless illustrates a characteristic mechanism of contemporary economic diplomacy. Political relationships are not negotiated exclusively through declarations, security guarantees, or territorial recognition. They are sometimes accompanied by investment prospects, market access, and industrial partnerships.

Private companies can therefore become instruments of rapprochement between states. But the boundary between economic facilitation and commercial interest must remain identifiable, particularly when the sectors involved benefit from public decisions, licenses, or government contracts.

From Diplomacy to Military Production

In June 2023, Shai Cohen, then head of Israel’s liaison office in Rabat, publicly discussed a potential industrial establishment by Elbit Systems in Morocco. Three years later, the production structures are taking shape.

The investigation published by Le Desk on October 8, 2026, identifies two companies, MMI Ammunition and MMI Weapon Systems, whose combined share capital reportedly reaches 380 million Moroccan dirhams. A third entity devoted to military communications, command, control, computers, and intelligence systems—generally grouped under the acronym C4I—is expected to complete the industrial structure.

According to the investigation, a holding company linked to Yariv El Baz participates in the ownership of the first two companies alongside interests associated with Elbit Systems.

This information concerning ownership relies on the newspaper’s investigation. The precise shareholding percentages, distribution of voting rights, and mechanisms of effective control require a complete reconstruction of the corporate records.

The existence of MMI’s industrial activities, however, is independently documented.

On October 8, Reuters reported that the company plans to begin delivering turrets in March 2027 for armored vehicles assembled in Morocco. Médias24 also described the industrial capabilities of MMI Weapon Systems, located at MidParc near Casablanca, and those of the ammunition operation at Sidi Yahya.

The project extends beyond the manufacture of a limited range of equipment. It encompasses 30-millimeter turrets, remotely operated weapon systems, armored vehicle modernization, counter-drone solutions, and the development of autonomous mortar systems.

MMI is also considering international markets, including a potential customer in a European NATO member state whose identity has not been disclosed.

The company states that 99% of its workforce, including engineers, is Moroccan. This proportion is an important indicator of local employment, but it is insufficient to measure technological autonomy.

A factory may employ an almost entirely domestic workforce while remaining dependent on foreign suppliers for critical components, software, manufacturing licenses, upgrades, and certain maintenance operations.

It is precisely this distinction that determines the depth of industrial sovereignty.

Ownership Does Not Tell the Whole Story of Sovereignty

The domestic establishment of a military industry serves several objectives. It can shorten procurement times, develop national expertise, facilitate local maintenance, and reduce certain logistical vulnerabilities.

It can also create a new form of dependence, less visible than importing a complete weapons system.

When a foreign company supplies essential technology, several contractual mechanisms determine how economic value is distributed.

The first concerns licensing. A Moroccan company may hold the right to manufacture equipment without owning the patents, software, or technical knowledge necessary to modify it independently. Associated royalties can become a lasting expense.

The second concerns procurement. If the most sophisticated components are imported from suppliers connected to the technology owner, a substantial share of industrial value added remains outside the country where final assembly takes place.

The third involves intragroup services. Technical assistance, engineering, training, maintenance, information technology, and management services may be invoiced by foreign companies to Moroccan subsidiaries or partners.

Such transactions are not inherently irregular. They are common practices within multinational corporate groups. Their economic and fiscal consequences nevertheless depend on the prices charged, the substance of the services provided, and compliance with the arm’s-length principle.

The fourth mechanism concerns exports. A factory located in Morocco may not enjoy complete freedom to sell its products when those products incorporate technologies subject to foreign authorization requirements.

In the defense industry, sovereignty therefore cannot be reduced to the geographical location of production. It depends on technological mastery, control over industrial decisions, and the ability to maintain operations in the event of diplomatic or commercial disruption.

Moroccan authorities possess regulatory instruments at several levels: authorization of activities involving military equipment, controls on sensitive imports and exports, foreign-exchange regulation, taxation, company law, and anti-money-laundering mechanisms.

Moroccan Law No. 10-20 notably governs defense and security equipment, weapons, and ammunition. Tax oversight of transactions between related companies provides another important instrument, particularly when technology, services, or financing circulate between jurisdictions.

The objective is not to presume the existence of irregularities at MMI. It is to determine what proportion of the new industrial capabilities is effectively controlled, financed, and economically retained in Morocco.

Forafric: The Other Trajectory

Yariv El Baz’s business history extends beyond diplomacy and military manufacturing.

He is also associated with Forafric, an agribusiness group historically active in flour milling and grain processing in Morocco. This industry occupies a strategic position in an economy where wheat imports, storage capacity, industrial processing, and food supply remain permanent concerns.

The group’s financial trajectory, however, has been marked by significant deterioration.

Forafric Global PLC’s consolidated financial statements, published through filings with the US Securities and Exchange Commission, show net losses of $12.5 million in 2023, $23.4 million in 2024, and $13.8 million in 2025.

Across these three financial years, cumulative net losses therefore reached approximately $49.7 million.

By the end of 2025, the group’s accumulated deficit stood at $154.6 million.

More importantly, the financial statements disclosed substantial uncertainty concerning the company’s ability to continue as a going concern. Management acknowledged that financial conditions and cash-flow projections raised substantial doubt about its capacity to meet obligations over the following twelve months.

The group reported efforts to secure additional financing, negotiate with investors and financial institutions, reduce certain expenses, and consider asset disposals or restructuring measures.

The reduction in annual losses between 2024 and 2025 is therefore insufficient to establish a sustainable recovery. It must be assessed alongside available liquidity, debt maturities, working-capital requirements, and the company’s ability to finance ongoing operations.

These difficulties also have a banking and judicial dimension in Morocco, where several companies within the Forafric perimeter have faced debt-recovery proceedings.

It is nevertheless essential to maintain the legal distinction between individuals and corporate entities. The financial difficulties of Forafric Global PLC do not demonstrate Yariv El Baz’s personal insolvency, nor that of other companies in which he may hold interests.

Instead, they raise a question of ownership architecture: how are the different investments organized, financed, and legally insulated from one another?

Capital Moves, but Risks Must Remain Identifiable

Within diversified corporate groups, the coexistence of financially distressed activities and new investments is not unusual.

A shareholder may hold an interest in a struggling company while investing, directly or indirectly, in another business that is profitable or expanding. Assets may belong to separate holding companies, be financed by different partners, or rely on independent sources of capital.

It would therefore be incorrect to infer from Forafric’s losses that military investments were necessarily financed with resources originating from the agribusiness group.

The financial question becomes more precise when examining the mechanisms capable of connecting different companies.

A holding company may receive dividends, extend shareholder loans, provide guarantees, hold intragroup receivables, or pledge its investments to obtain financing. Investors may also participate at several levels of a corporate structure, with economic rights that differ from their voting rights.

Cross-guarantees deserve particular attention. Under applicable legal conditions, one company may guarantee the obligations of another entity within the same economic group. Risk can consequently move between businesses whose operations appear unrelated.

Conversely, rigorous legal and financial separation can prevent difficulties affecting one company from spreading to other investments.

In the case of interests associated with Yariv El Baz, the public information currently available does not establish the existence of financial transfers, cross-guarantees, or loans between Forafric and the MMI companies.

It would be equally premature to assert that no such relationships exist without examining financial statements, security registers, related-party agreements, and the corporate records of the relevant holding companies.

This limited visibility is precisely one of the difficulties involved in publicly analyzing international private business groups.

The Beneficial Ownership Question

The multiplication of intermediary companies can serve entirely legitimate purposes: bringing in partners, protecting assets, separating risks, organizing succession, or structuring investments across several countries.

It can also complicate the identification of those who exercise effective control.

A distinction must be made between the legal owner of an investment, its economic beneficiary, and the person or entity possessing decision-making authority.

A company may own 30% of another company’s capital while benefiting from significant veto rights. Another may hold a majority of shares but have granted a partner decisive powers over investment decisions, technology licensing, or executive appointments.

Shareholder agreements, financing arrangements, preferential rights, and technology contracts can therefore profoundly alter the apparent balance of ownership.

This reality is particularly sensitive in defense industries, where effective corporate control involves interests extending beyond those of private investors.

Transparency does not necessarily require the public disclosure of every industrial or military detail. National security considerations may justify keeping certain contracts, technologies, or suppliers confidential.

But such confidentiality should not prevent competent authorities from identifying beneficial owners, the origin of capital, relationships between shareholders, and the individuals or entities exercising decisive control.

International anti-money-laundering standards, particularly those developed by the Financial Action Task Force, are built around the ability of authorities to obtain adequate, accurate, and up-to-date information on the beneficial ownership of legal entities.

In MMI’s case, identifying a holding company linked to Yariv El Baz provides an initial piece of information. It does not replace the need to establish the complete ownership chain, indirect interests, and associated control rights.

The Strategic State and Its Private Partners

The development of a Moroccan military industry forms part of a broader transformation in the role of the state.

For several decades, much of industrial policy was based on attracting foreign investment, integrating into international value chains, and expanding export capacity.

The emerging period adds a strategic dimension. Governments are seeking to secure supplies, manufacture certain sensitive equipment domestically, and reduce exposure to decisions taken by foreign suppliers.

Morocco is pursuing this transformation across several industries: automotive manufacturing, aerospace, renewable energy, batteries, and now defense.

These sectors nevertheless operate according to different economic structures.

In the automotive industry, the establishment of a foreign manufacturer can generate measurable effects on employment, exports, and the development of domestic suppliers. In defense, industrial benefits must also be evaluated in light of technological restrictions, export authorizations, and security requirements.

The presence of international private investors can accelerate access to technology and markets. It can also introduce lasting contractual dependencies.

The public-policy challenge is therefore to determine what the country receives in exchange for the advantages it grants: skilled employment, training, technology transfers, tax revenues, local procurement, intellectual property, or autonomous development capabilities.

A factory can be economically productive without being fully sovereign. Conversely, a foreign partnership can contribute to growing autonomy when it enables progressive technological mastery, engineer training, and the emergence of domestic suppliers.

The outcome depends less on the nationality of the partners than on the rights, capabilities, and expertise actually transferred.

A Diplomatic Relationship Becomes an Industrial Architecture

The chronology of the rapprochement between Morocco and Israel is instructive.

In 2020, relations were restored through a diplomatic framework that also involved Washington. In 2021, the two countries concluded a defense cooperation agreement. In 2023, plans for Israeli industrial investment in Morocco were publicly discussed. In 2026, MMI presented locally manufactured equipment and announced new delivery prospects.

This sequence does not mean that every industrial project mechanically resulted from a particular diplomatic negotiation.

It does, however, show how an international decision can progressively transform investment opportunities.

Companies no longer operate exclusively as suppliers of imported goods. They participate in the creation of local production capabilities, the organization of industrial partnerships, and sometimes the establishment of new export industries.

Within this evolution, private intermediaries occupy a distinctive position.

They may appear at the beginning of the process, when political relationships are being established, and subsequently within the economic structures that emerge after normalization. Their familiarity with decision-makers, markets, and industrial partners then becomes a relational advantage.

Such an advantage is not inherently improper. But when the sectors involved concern national sovereignty, its economic consequences warrant transparency proportionate to the interests at stake.

The question is therefore not whether a businessman is entitled to maintain political relationships or invest in several industries. It is how competition, financial traceability, and the independence of public decisions are preserved.

What the Investigation Has Yet to Establish

The available information outlines a coherent trajectory, but it also contains limitations that should not be obscured.

The intermediary role attributed to Yariv El Baz during the 2020 negotiations has been documented in several press reports. His indirect participation in the MMI companies was revealed by Le Desk in October 2026. MMI’s industrial activities have been independently reported by Reuters and Médias24. Forafric’s financial difficulties are documented in published consolidated accounts.

These elements do not demonstrate the existence of an irregular financial transaction, cross-financing between agribusiness and defense, preferential treatment in the award of contracts, or improper interference in government decisions.

Several additional pieces of information are necessary to advance the investigation: the exact identity and ownership percentages of MMI shareholders, the funding and payment of subscribed capital, financing agreements, the nature of technology licenses, the control rights of the partners, and any contractual relationships between the companies concerned and other entities associated with El Baz.

The disclosure of these elements would make it possible to determine whether the identified interests amount to a minority financial investment, a position of decisive influence, or a more complex control structure.

Above all, it would help establish how much economic and technological value is actually retained in Morocco.

Yariv El Baz’s trajectory brings together three dimensions rarely examined as a whole.

The first is diplomatic: the ability of a private actor to operate within international networks and facilitate contacts between governments.

The second is financial: the organization of economic interests through companies, shareholdings, and activities established across several jurisdictions.

The third is industrial: the entry of international capital and technology into sectors that states consider essential to their autonomy.

The contrast between Forafric’s financial difficulties and the emergence of defense-related investments adds another dimension to this trajectory. It demonstrates that the same broader ownership environment may include businesses exposed to very different risks, without their assets, liabilities, or financing necessarily being combined.

The purpose of transparency is precisely to identify these boundaries.

For Morocco, the issue extends far beyond a single investor. The development of a national defense industry represents a potentially significant strategic transformation. But its actual importance cannot be measured solely by the number of factories inaugurated or the nominal value of their share capital.

It must be measured through technological mastery, decision-making autonomy, the depth of national expertise, the value added retained domestically, and the capacity of institutions to oversee the interests involved.

Globalization accustomed states to seeking capital capable of crossing borders. The new era of industrial geopolitics requires them to know exactly who provides that capital, what it controls, and what value it ultimately extracts.

Because sovereignty does not begin only when a country manufactures its own equipment. It also begins when that country knows who owns the companies manufacturing it.

Principal Sources

  • Le Desk, Soufiane Sbiti, October 8, 2026, “Armement : Yariv El Baz, actionnaire discret avec l'israélien Elbit Systems dans les usines MMI au Maroc.” Investigation into the ownership structure of MMI.
  • Reuters, October 8, 2026, “Moroccan defense firm MMI targets turret deliveries in March 2027.” Industrial operations, delivery schedule, and export ambitions.
  • Médias24, Nawfal Kaiss, October 8, 2026, “Au Marrakech Airshow, MMI dévoile ses ambitions souveraines, du blindé M113 à la lutte antidrone.” Production capabilities, industrial organization, and technological development.
  • Forafric Global PLC, 2025 Annual Report, Form 20-F filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission in 2026. Consolidated accounts, losses, liquidity, and going-concern risks.
  • Le Desk, Omar Kabbadj, December 16, 2020, “Les multiples casseroles de Yariv Elbaz, entremetteur du deal Maroc-Israël-USA.” Investigation into El Baz’s business networks and reported intermediary role.
  • Le Desk, Ali Amar, December 11, 2020, “Maroc-Israël : Washington a promis une aide de 3 milliards de dollars à Rabat.” Diplomatic negotiations and proposed American financing.
  • Associated Press, December 10, 2020. Reporting on Morocco–Israel normalization and US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.
  • Financial Action Task Force (FATF), recommendations on transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons.
  • Kingdom of Morocco, Law No. 10-20 governing defense and security equipment, weapons, and ammunition.